INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND THE CROSS-SECTION OF STOCK RETURNS by Baker, Malcolm & Wurgler, Jeffrey
  
Working Paper Series     ASSET MANAGEMENT Research Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND THE CROSS-SECTION OF STOCK RETURNS 
 
Malcolm Baker  
Jeffrey Wurgler 
 
 SC-AM-03-13 
Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malcolm Baker 
Harvard Business School and NBER 
mbaker@hbs.edu 
 
Jeffrey Wurgler 
NYU Stern School of Business 
jwurgler@stern.nyu.edu 
 
November 2, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. Theory predicts 
that a broad wave of sentiment will disproportionately affect stocks whose valuations are highly 
subjective and are difficult to arbitrage. We test this prediction by studying how the cross-section 
of subsequent stock returns varies with proxies for beginning-of-period investor sentiment. When 
sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high on smaller stocks, high volatility stocks, 
unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme-growth stocks, and distressed stocks, 
consistent with an initial underpricing of these stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, 
these patterns attenuate or fully reverse. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions 
and are unlikely to reflect an alternative explanation based on compensation for systematic risks.  
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I. Introduction 
Classical finance theory gives no role to investor sentiment. Investors are rational and 
diversify to optimize the statistical properties of their portfolios. Competition among them leads 
to an equilibrium in which prices equal the rationally discounted value of expected cash flows, 
and in which the cross-section of expected returns depends on the cross-section of systematic 
risks.1 Even if some investors are irrational, classical theory argues, their demands will be offset 
by arbitrageurs and similar conclusions for prices will obtain.  
In this paper, we present evidence that suggests investor sentiment has strong effects on 
the cross-section of stock prices. We start with some simple theoretical predictions. A mispricing 
is the outcome of both an uninformed demand shock and a binding arbitrage constraint. A broad-
based wave of sentiment is then predicted to have cross-sectional effects, as opposed to raising or 
lowering all prices by the same amount, when either sentiment-based demands or arbitrage 
constraints vary across stocks. In practice, these two channels lead to quite similar predictions. 
Stocks that are likely to be most sensitive to sentiment-driven demand – stocks whose valuations 
are highly subjective – also tend to be the riskiest and costliest to arbitrage. Concretely, theory 
suggests two separate channels through which the stocks of newer, smaller, highly volatile firms, 
firms in distress or with extreme growth potential, and firms without dividends are predicted to 
be relatively more affected by investor sentiment.  
To investigate this prediction empirically, and to get a more tangible sense of the 
intrinsically elusive concept of investor sentiment, we begin with a brief summary of rises and 
falls in U.S. market sentiment from 1961 through the recent Internet bubble. This summary is 
                                                 
1 See Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) for a recent model in this tradition.  
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based on anecdotal accounts and thus is only suggestive, but it appears broadly consistent with 
our theoretical predictions, and suggests more formal empirical tests are warranted. 
Our main empirical approach is as follows. Because cross-sectional patterns of sentiment-
driven mispricing would be difficult to identify directly, we look for the hypothesized patterns in 
subsequent stock returns that appear when one conditions on proxies for beginning-of-period 
investor sentiment. Conditional cross-sectional patterns in subsequent returns may represent the 
initial patterns of mispricing correcting themselves over time. For example, relatively low future 
returns on young firms when sentiment was high suggest that young firms were overvalued ex 
ante. As usual, there is a joint hypothesis problem. By using this approach, we must also 
consider the possibility that any such patterns are compensation for systematic risks.  
The first step is to gather proxies for investor sentiment to use as time series conditioning 
variables. We use a number of proxies suggested by recent work, and we also construct a novel 
composite index based on their first principal component. To further reduce the likelihood that 
these proxies are connected to systematic risks, we orthogonalize each of them to a wide range of 
macroeconomic conditions. The resulting sentiment proxies are highly correlated and visibly line 
up with anecdotal accounts of past bubbles.  
We then examine whether the cross-section of stock returns varies with beginning-of-
period sentiment in the predicted manner. We use monthly stock returns between 1963 and 2001. 
Our first method is to sort firm-month observations according to the level of sentiment, first, and 
then the decile rank of a given firm characteristic, second. We find that when sentiment is low, 
small stocks earn particularly high subsequent returns, but when sentiment is high, there is no 
size effect at all. Conditional patterns are even sharper when sorting on other characteristics. 
When sentiment is low subsequent returns are higher on young stocks than older stocks, high-
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return volatility than low-return volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks than profitable ones, and 
nonpayers than dividend payers. When sentiment is high, these patterns completely reverse. In 
other words, several characteristics that were not known to have (and do not have) any 
unconditional predictive power actually reveal sign-flip patterns, in the predicted directions, 
when one conditions on sentiment.  
The sorts also reveal a U-shaped pattern involving growth firms and distressed firms. 
Note that when stocks are sorted into deciles by sales growth, book-to-market, or external 
financing activity, growth and distressed firms lie at opposing extremes, with more stable firms 
in the middle deciles. We find that when sentiment is low, returns are high on both extreme-
growth and distressed stocks, relative to middle deciles. But when beginning-of-period sentiment 
is high, this U shape flips upside down, and the extreme deciles earn relatively low subsequent 
returns. This pattern is again consistent with our predictions, because extreme-growth and 
distressed firms have highly subjective valuations and also tend to be harder to arbitrage than 
more typical firms. Both effects suggest a greater sensitivity to sentiment. Again, note that these 
conditional U patterns, like the conditional monotonic patterns described above, are averaged 
away in unconditional studies. 
We confirm the statistical significance of these patterns with two regression approaches, 
and then turn to the alternative explanation that they reflect compensation for systematic risks. 
As a start, our sentiment proxies are orthogonal to contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions. 
In addition, other aspects of the results cast doubt on this explanation. The systematic risk 
explanation requires either time variation in rational, market-wide risk premia or time variation 
in the cross-sectional pattern of risk, or beta loadings. We directly test the second possibility and 
find no link between the patterns in predictability and patterns in betas with market returns or 
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consumption growth. If risk is not changing over time, then the first possibility requires not just 
time-variation in risk premia but changes in sign, such that in half of our sample period (when 
sentiment proxies are low), old, less volatile, profitable, dividend-paying firms require a risk 
premium over young, highly volatile, unprofitable, nonpayers. Such a pattern is at best 
counterintuitive. Finally, we uncover some conditional patterns in returns around firms’ earnings 
announcements, which suggest that a component of the results can be attributed to expectational 
errors. For these reasons, compensation for systematic risk is an unlikely explanation.  
The evidence presented here challenges the classical view of the cross-section of stock 
prices and carries significant implications, some of which we mention in the conclusion. Here we 
note that the paper builds on several recent themes in asset pricing. Campbell and Cochrane 
(2000), Wachter (2000), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2002) 
consider the cross-sectional effects of conditional systematic risks, as we condition on sentiment. 
Daniel and Titman (1997) test a characteristics-based model for the cross-section of expected 
returns. Our specification extends this idea and offers a specific, conditional motivation. Shleifer 
(2000) surveys early work on sentiment and limited arbitrage, the two key ingredients here. 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2003), and Peng and Xiong (2002) 
discuss models of category-level trading, and Fama and French (1993) document strong 
comovement of stocks of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios. Sentiment-driven demand 
shocks for categories of stocks with similar characteristics are central to our results. Finally, our 
results complement and build on earlier work on the time-series effects of sentiment (Kothari and 
Shanken (1997), Neal and Wheatley (1998), Shiller (1981, 2000), and Baker and Wurgler 
(2000)) and relationships among sentiment, initial public offerings, and small stock returns (Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), Swaminathan (1996), and Neal and Wheatley (1998)).  
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Section II discusses relevant theory. Section III provides a qualitative history of recent 
speculative episodes. Section IV describes the empirical hypotheses and the data, and the main 
empirical tests are contained in Section V. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Theoretical effects of sentiment on the cross-section 
A mispricing is the result of an uninformed demand shock and a limit on arbitrage. This 
observation suggests that there are two distinct channels through which investor sentiment, as 
defined more precisely below, might affect the cross-section of stock prices. In the first channel, 
sentimental demand shocks vary in the cross-section, while limits on arbitrage are held constant. 
In the second, the difficulty of arbitrage varies across stocks but sentiment is generic. We discuss 
the two channels in turn.  
A. Cross-sectional variation in sentiment  
One possible definition of investor sentiment is the propensity to speculate. Under this 
definition, sentiment drives the relative demand for speculative investments, and so causes cross-
sectional effects even if arbitrage forces are the same across stocks.  
What makes certain stocks more vulnerable to broad shifts in the propensity to speculate? 
Perhaps the main factor is the subjectivity of their valuations. For instance, consider a canonical 
young, unprofitable, extreme-growth potential stock. The lack of an earnings history combined 
with the presence of apparently unlimited growth opportunities allows unsophisticated investors 
to defend, with equal plausibility, a wide spectrum of valuations, from much too low to much too 
high, as suits their sentiment. In a bubble period, when the propensity to speculate is apparently 
high, this profile of characteristics also allows investment bankers or, worse, swindlers, to further 
argue for the high end of valuations. By contrast, the value of a firm with a long earnings history 
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and stable dividends is much less subjective, and so its stock is likely to be less affected by 
fluctuations in the propensity to speculate. 
 This suggests how variation in the propensity to speculate may generally affect the cross-
section, but not how sentimental investors actually choose individual stocks. We suggest that 
they may simply demand stocks that have the bundle of salient characteristics that is compatible 
with their sentiment.2 That is, those with a low propensity to speculate may demand profitable, 
dividend-paying stocks not because profitability and dividends are correlated with some 
unobservable firm property that defines safety, but precisely because the salient characteristics 
“profitability” and “dividends” are used to infer safety.3 Likewise, the salient characteristics “no 
earnings,” “young age,” and “no dividends” may mark the stock as speculative. This investment 
process seems more realistic than that of Markowitz (1959), in which investors view individual 
securities in terms of their statistical properties. 
B. Cross-sectional variation in arbitrage 
Investor sentiment might also be reasonably defined as optimism or pessimism about 
stocks in general. Indiscriminate waves of sentiment still affect the cross-section, however, if 
arbitrage forces are relatively weaker in a subset of stocks.  
Theoretical and empirical research suggests that arbitrage tends to be particularly risky 
and costly for young, small, unprofitable extreme-growth or distressed stocks. Their high 
                                                 
2 The idea that investors view securities as a vector of salient characteristics borrows from Lancaster (1966, 1971), 
who views consumer demand theory from the perspective that the utility of a consumer good (e.g, oranges) derives 
from more primitive characteristics (fiber and vitamin C). 
3 The implications of categorization for finance have recently been explored by Baker and Wurgler (2003), Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003), Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2003), Greenwood and Sosner (2003), and Peng and Xiong 
(2002). Note that if investors infer category membership from salient characteristics (some psychologists propose 
that category membership is determined by the presence of defining or characteristic features, e.g. Smith, Shoben, 
and Rips (1974)), then sentiment-driven demand will be directly connected to characteristics even if sentimental 
investors undertake an intervening process of categorization and trade entirely at the category level. It is also 
empirically convenient to boil key investment categories down into vectors of stable and measurable characteristics: 
one can use the same empirical framework to study such episodes as the late-1960’s growth stocks bubble and the 
Internet bubble. 
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idiosyncratic risk makes relative-value arbitrage especially risky (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 
(2002)). They tend to be more costly to trade (Amihud and Mendelsohn (1986)) and particularly 
expensive, sometimes impossible, to sell short (D’Avolio (2002), Geczy, Musto, and Reed 
(2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), Duffie, Pedersen, and Garleanu (2003), Lamont and Thaler 
(2003), and Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002)). Further, their lower liquidity also exposes 
would-be arbitrageurs to predatory attacks (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2003)).  
Note that, in practice, it is generally true that the same stocks that are the hardest to 
arbitrage are also most vulnerable to sentiment. While for expositional purposes we outline 
these two channels separately, they are likely to have overlapping effects. And while this makes 
the channels themselves difficult to distinguish empirically, it makes it easier to derive robust 
empirical predictions for the cross-sectional effects of sentiment, broadly defined. Indeed, the 
two channels may even amplify each other. For example, the fact that investors can convince 
themselves of an especially wide range of valuations in certain regions of the cross-section is a 
noise-trader risk that further deters short-horizon arbitrageurs (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).4 
 
III. An anecdotal history of investor sentiment, 1961-2002 
 In this section we offer a brief summary of U.S. stock market bubbles between 1961 to 
2002, matching the period of our own data. The reader eager to see results may skip this section, 
but it will prove useful for three reasons. First, despite great interest in the effects of investor 
sentiment, the literature does not appear to contain even the most basic qualitative comparative 
                                                 
4 We do not incorporate the equilibrium prediction of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), namely 
that securities with more exposure to sentiment have higher unconditional expected returns. Elton, Gruber, and 
Busse (1998) argue that expected returns are not higher on stocks that have higher sensitivities to the closed-end 
fund discount, a proxy for investor sentiment.  
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description of recent speculative episodes. Second, a knowledge of the rough timing of these 
episodes will help us make a preliminary judgment about the accuracy of the quantitative proxies 
for sentiment we develop later. Third, the discussion sheds some initial, albeit anecdotal light on 
the plausibility of our theoretical predictions.  
Our brief history of sentiment is distilled from several secondary sources. Kindleberger 
(2001) draws general lessons from bubbles and crashes over the past few hundred years, while 
Brown (1991), Dreman (1979), Malkiel (1990, 1999), Shiller (2000), and Siegel (1998) focus 
more specifically on recent U.S. stock market episodes. We take each of these accounts with a 
grain of salt, and emphasize only those themes that appear repeatedly.  
We start in 1961, a year in which Malkiel (1990) and Brown (1991) note a high demand 
for small, young, growth stocks. Dreman (1979, p. 70) confirms their account. Malkiel writes of 
a “new-issue mania” that was concentrated on new “tronics” firms. “… The tronics boom came 
back to earth in 1962. The tailspin started early in the year and exploded in a horrendous selling 
wave … Growth stocks took the brunt of the decline, falling much further than the general 
market” (p. 54 - 57).  
The next bubble develops in 1967 and 1968. Brown writes that “scores of franchisers, 
computer firms, and mobile home manufactures seemed to promise overnight wealth. … [while] 
quality was pretty much forgotten” (p. 90). Malkiel and Dreman also note this pattern – a focus 
on firms with strong earnings growth or potential, and an avoidance of “the major industrial 
giants, ‘buggywhip companies,’ as they were sometimes contemptuously called” (Dreman 1979, 
p. 74-75). Another characteristic viewed as out of favor was dividends. According to the New 
York Times, “during the speculative market of the late 1960’s many brokers told customers that it 
didn’t matter whether a company paid a dividend – just so long as its stock kept going up” 
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(9/13/1976).  But “after 1968, as it became clear that capital losses were possible, investors came 
to value dividends” (10/7/1999).  
 Anecdotal accounts invariably describe the early 1970’s as a bear market, with sentiment 
at a low level. However, a set of old, large, stable, consistently profitable stocks known as the 
“nifty fifty” enjoyed notably high valuations. Brown, Malkiel, and Siegel (1998) each highlight 
this episode. Siegel writes, “All of these stocks had proven growth records, continual increases in 
dividends … and high market capitalization” (p. 106). Note that this speculative episode is a 
mirror image of those described above (and below). They center on small, young, unprofitable 
growth stocks in periods of high sentiment, while the nifty fifty episode appears to be a bubble in 
a set of firms with an opposite set of characteristics (old, large, and continuous earnings and 
dividend growth) and happens in a period of low sentiment.  
The late 1970’s through mid-1980’s are described as a period of generally high sentiment 
that saw a series of speculative episodes. Dreman describes a bubble in gambling issues in 1977 
and 78. Ritter (1984) studies the hot issue market of 1980, finding greater initial returns on IPOs 
of natural resource start-ups than on larger, mature, profitable offerings. Of 1983, Malkiel (p. 74-
75) writes that “the high-technology new-issue boom of the first half of 1983 was an almost 
perfect replica of the 1960’s episodes … The bubble appears to have burst early in the second 
half of 1983 … the carnage in the small company and new-issue markets was truly catastrophic.” 
Brown confirms this account. Of the mid-1980’s, Malkiel writes that “What electronics was to 
the 1960’s, biotechnology became to the 1980’s. … new issues of biotech companies were 
eagerly gobbled up. … having positive sales and earnings was actually considered a drawback” 
(p. 77-79). But by 1987 and 1988, “market sentiment had changed from an acceptance of an 
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exciting story … to a desire to stay closer to earth with low-multiple stocks that actually pay 
dividends” (p. 79). 
 The late-1990’s bubble in technology stocks will be familiar to the reader. By all 
accounts, sentiment was broadly high before the bubble began to burst in 2000. The bubble is 
analyzed in more detail by Cochrane (2002) and Ofek and Richardson (2002a,b). Malkiel draws 
parallels to episodes in the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s, and Shiller (2000) compares the Internet 
to the late 1920’s. As in earlier speculative episodes that occurred in high sentiment periods, 
demand for dividend payers seems to have been low (New York Times, 1/6/1998). Ljungqvist 
and Wilhelm (2003) find that 80% of 1999 and 2000 IPOs had negative earnings per share and 
that the median age of 1999 IPOs was 4 years. This compares to an average age of over 9 years 
just prior to the emergence of the bubble, and to an average age of over 12 years by 2001 and 
2002 (Ritter, 2003). 
 These anecdotal accounts suggest that there may be some regularities in how the cross-
section depends on investor sentiment. One pattern seems to be that canonical extreme-growth 
stocks are especially prone to bubbles, and subsequent crashes, consistent with the observation 
that they tend to appeal to speculators and optimists and at the same time are hard to arbitrage. 
The “nifty fifty” bubble is an exception to this pattern. However, anecdotal accounts suggest that 
this bubble appears in a period of broadly low sentiment, so it might still be reconciled with the 
main cross-sectional prediction that an increase in sentiment will increase the relative price of 
stocks that are most subjective to value and hardest to arbitrage. We turn to more formal tests of 
this prediction.   
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IV. Empirical approach and data 
A. Empirical approach 
 Theory and historical anecdote both suggest that sentiment may cause systematic patterns 
of mispricing. Because mispricing is hard to identify directly, however, we will look for 
systematic patterns of correction of mispricings in the form of conditional patterns in cross-
sectional return predictability. For example, if returns on young and unprofitable firms tend to be 
relatively low, conditional on a high estimate of beginning-of-period sentiment, it may reflect the 
effects of a correction of a bubble in growth stocks. 
Specifically, we organize our empirical work around the following model: 
 [ ] 11211 '' --- ++= ittitit TaRE xbxb  (1) 
where i indexes firms or securities, t is time, x is a vector of firm or security characteristics, and 
T is a time series conditioning variable that proxies for investor sentiment. The null hypothesis is 
that b2 is zero or, more precisely, that any nonzero effect is due to rational compensation for 
bearing systematic risk. The alternative is that b2 is nonzero and reflects the correction of 
mispricings. We refer to Eq. (1) as a “conditional characteristics model,” as it adds conditional 
effects to the specification of Daniel and Titman (1997).  
We use Eq. (1) as an organizing framework to test for conditional characteristics effects, 
not as a structural model. We will sort stocks by x and T and tabulate the subsequent returns in 
each bin, and we will run predictive regressions. Either way, the basic strategy is to use 
sentiment proxies as conditioning variables, and then see whether the manner in which 
characteristics spread future returns depends on the conditioning variable. This will help us to 
answer the first-order question of whether sentiment, broadly defined, has cross-sectional effects. 
We will also address the question of whether any conditional characteristics effects reflect 
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mispricing or compensation for systematic risk. We will leave interesting but subtler questions, 
such as the extent to which rejections of the null are due to cross-sectional variation in sentiment 
or constraints on arbitrage, to future research. 
B. Characteristics and returns 
The firm-level data is from the merged CRSP-Compustat database. The sample includes 
all common stock (share codes 10 and 11) of nonfinancial firms (excluding SIC code 6) between 
1962 through 2001. Following Fama and French (1992), we match accounting data for fiscal 
year-ends in calendar year t-1 to (monthly) returns from July t through June t+1, and also use 
their variable definitions where possible.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics. Panel A summarizes returns variables. Following 
common practice, momentum MOM is defined as the cumulative raw return for the eleven-
month period between 12 and two months prior to the observation return. (Note we will examine 
momentum as a control or robustness variable, not as a firm characteristic in itself.)  
The remaining panels summarize the firm and security characteristics that we consider. 
The previous sections’ discussions point us directly to several variables. To that list, we add a 
few more characteristics that, by introspection, seem likely to be salient to investors. Overall, we 
group characteristics roughly, as pertaining most directly to firm size and age, profitability, 
dividends, growth opportunities, and distress.  
Panel B summarizes size and age characteristics. Market equity ME from June of year t, 
measured as price times shares outstanding from CRSP, is matched to monthly returns from July 
of year t through June of year t+1. Age is the number of years since the firm’s first appearance on 
CRSP, measured to the nearest month.5 Sigma is the standard deviation of monthly returns over 
                                                 
5 Barry and Brown (1984) use the more accurate term “period of listing.”  
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the twelve months ending in June of year t. If there are at least nine returns to estimate it, Sigma 
is then matched to monthly returns from July of year t through June of year t+1. 
Panel C summarizes profitability characteristics. The return on equity E+/BE is positive 
for profitable firms and zero for unprofitable firms. Earnings (E) is income before extraordinary 
items (Item 18) plus income statement deferred taxes (Item 50) minus preferred dividends (Item 
19), if earnings are positive; book equity (BE) is shareholders equity (Item 60) plus balance sheet 
deferred taxes (Item 35). E>0 is a dummy variable for profitable firms.  
Panel D summarizes dividend characteristics. Dividends to equity D/BE is dividends per 
share at the ex date (Item 26) times Compustat shares outstanding (Item 25) divided by book 
equity. D>0 is a dummy for positive dividends per share by the ex date. The recent decline in the 
percentage of firms that pay dividends noted by Fama and French (2001) is apparent. As they 
point out, this is partly attributable to the increasing proportion of unprofitable firms.  
Panel E summarizes characteristics that may be indictors of growth opportunities, 
distress, or both. The elements of book-to-market equity BE/ME are defined above. External 
finance activity EF/A is defined as the change in assets (Item 6) minus the change in retained 
earnings (Item 36) divided by assets. Sales growth (GS) is the change in net sales (Item 12) 
divided by prior-year net sales. We measure and report sales growth GS/10 as the decile of the 
firm’s sales growth in the prior year relative to NYSE firms’ decile breakpoints.  
It is important to bear in mind that the variables in Panel E, in particular, capture multiple 
effects. For instance, book-to-market wears at least three distinct hats: extremely high values are 
likely to indicate distress; extremely low values are likely to indicate high growth opportunities; 
and, as a scaled-price variable, book-to-market also serves as a generic valuation indicator, 
varying with mispricing or rational expected returns. The sales growth and external finance 
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variables wear at least two hats: extremely low values (which are negative) are likely to indicate 
distress; extremely high values are likely to indicate high growth opportunities. To the extent that 
market timing motives are important to external finance, that variable also serves as a generic 
misvaluation indicator. 
In Panels C, D, and E, the accounting data for fiscal years ending in calendar year t-1 are 
matched to monthly returns from July of year t through June of year t+1. To reduce the influence 
of outliers and data errors, all of the explanatory variables are Winsorized each year at their 0.5 
and 99.5 percentiles.  
C. Investor sentiment 
 Prior work suggests a number of proxies for sentiment to use as time-series conditioning 
variables. We use six – the average closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number 
and average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium 
– as well as a composite sentiment index that is based on the first principal component of these 
proxies. Our sentiment proxies are measured annually from 1962 through 2001.  
To isolate the sentiment component of the proxies from business cycle components, we 
orthogonalize each proxy with respect to several macroeconomic variables. Specifically, we 
regress each of the raw proxies on growth in the industrial production index (Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release G.17), growth in consumer durables, nondurables, and services (all from BEA 
National Income Accounts Table 2.10), and a dummy variable for NBER recessions. We take the 
residuals from these regressions as a cleaner proxy that is independent of major business cycle 
effects. All of our results are based on these cleaned proxies. 
Table 2 summarizes the raw proxies in Panel A and the cleaned versions in Panel B. 
Figure 1 plots both versions. The closed-end fund discount CEFD is the average difference 
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between the NAV of closed-end stock fund shares and their market prices. Prior work suggests 
that the discount is inversely related to sentiment. Zweig (1973) uses the discount to forecast 
reversion in Dow Jones stocks, and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that sentiment 
explains several features of the discount. We take the value-weighted average discount on 
closed-end stock funds for 1962 through 1993 from Neal and Wheatley (1998), for 1994 through 
1998 from CDA/Wiesenberger, and for 1999 through 2001 from turn-of-the-year issues of the 
Wall Street Journal.  
NYSE share turnover is based on the ratio of reported share volume to average shares 
listed from the NYSE Fact Book. Baker and Stein (2002) suggest that turnover, and more 
generally liquidity, can serve as a sentiment index. In a market with short-sales constraints, 
irrational investors participate and thus add liquidity only when they are optimistic, and hence 
high liquidity tends to coincide with overvaluation. Consistent with this interpretation, Jones 
(2001) finds that high turnover forecasts low market returns. Turnover displays an exponential 
positive trend over our period, however, and the May 1975 elimination of fixed commissions 
have a visible effect. As a partial solution, the raw turnover ratio TURN is detrended by the five-
year moving average (specifically, the log of the ratio is detrended by its moving average). This 
helps the variable to identify sharp changes in turnover, but it will clearly still pick up the sharp 
changes caused by market structure.  
The IPO market is often viewed as sensitive to sentiment, and high first-day returns on 
IPOs may also be a measure of investor enthusiasm. The low returns on IPOs are consistent with 
successful market timing (Stigler (1964), Ritter (1991)). We take the number of IPOs NIPO and 
the average first-day returns RIPO in a given year from Jay Ritter’s website, which updates the 
sample in Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). Of course, there are many non-sentiment reasons 
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for why IPO volume and so-called underpricing vary over time, but they do not have direct 
implications for cross-sectional return predictability.  
The share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues is another measure of financing 
activity that may capture an aspect of sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2000) find that when the 
equity share is in its bottom (top) historical quartile, the next year’s equal-weighted market 
return averages 27% (-8%), and argue that part of this predictability reflects market timing by 
firms made possible by sentiment-driven mispricing. The equity share is defined as gross equity 
issuance divided by gross equity plus gross long-term debt issuance using data from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin.6 
The dividend premium PD-ND is the log ratio of the average market-to-book ratios of 
payers and nonpayers. Baker and Wurgler (2002) motivate the dividend premium as a proxy for 
relative investor demand for dividend payers. Because Fama and French (2001) find that payers 
are larger, more profitable, and have weaker growth opportunities, the dividend premium may 
also pick up investor demand for this correlated bundle of characteristics. 
Intuitively, to detect the hypothesized cross-sectional patterns in predictability, we want 
to condition on turning points in investor sentiment. But the sentiment proxies themselves have 
certain lead-lag relationships, raising the possibility that different variables may reflect the same 
sentiment factor at different times. For instance, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Lowry and Schwert 
(2002), and Benveniste, Wilhelm, Ljungqvist, and Yu (2003) find that IPO volume lags the first-
day returns on IPOs. One interpretation of this fact is that sentiment is in part behind the high 
first-day returns, and this attracts additional IPO volume with a lag. More generally, proxies that 
                                                 
6 While they both reflect equity issues, the number of IPOs and the equity share have important differences. The 
equity share includes seasoned offerings, is known to predict market returns, and scales by total external finance to 
isolate the composition of finance from the level. On the other hand, the IPO variables may better reflect demand for 
certain IPO-like regions of the cross-section that theory and history suggest are most sensitive to sentiment. 
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involve firm supply responses (S and NIPO) are likely to lag proxies that are based on investor 
demand or investor behavior (RIPO, PD-ND, TURN, and CEFD).  
We also form a novel composite index SENTIMENT in order to capture the common 
factor in the six proxies, and to help us identify their best relative timing. The procedure is as 
follows. We start by estimating the first principal component of the six proxies and their lags. 
This gives us a first-stage index with twelve loadings, one for each of the current and lagged 
proxies. We then compute the correlation between the first-stage index and the current and 
lagged values of each of the proxies. Finally, we construct SENTIMENT as the first principal 
component of the correlation matrix of six variables – each proxy’s lead or lag, whichever has 
the higher correlation with the first-stage index.  
This procedure leads to a final, more parsimonious index: 
SENTIMENTt   = ttt NIPOTURNCEFD 414.0402.0358.0 1 ++- -  
 NDDttt PSRIPO
-
-- -++ 11. 431.0371.04640    (2) 
where for Eq. (2) each of the six components was first cleaned of macroeconomic conditions and 
standardized. The first principal component explains 53% of the (standardized) sample variance, 
and only the first eigenvalue is above 1.00, so we conclude that one factor captures the common 
variation. The correlation between the twelve-term first-stage index and the SENTIMENT index 
is 0.96, suggesting that little information is lost in dropping six terms.  
Certain aspects of this index are intuitively appealing. First, each individual sentiment 
proxy enters with the expected sign. Second, all but one of the proxies enter with the expected 
timing – with the exception of CEFD, price and investor behavior variables lead firm supply 
variables. We will make use of this pattern in the subsequent analysis, i.e. we will condition on 
the first predetermined value of CEFD, NIPO, S, and SENTIMENT, and the lag of that value for 
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TURN, RIPO, and PD-ND. Third, the index irons out some extreme observations. The dividend 
premium and the first-day IPO returns reached unprecedented levels in 1999. For these to work 
as individual predictors over the whole sample, these levels must be matched exactly to extreme 
future returns. 
Figure 1 shows that the sentiment proxies line up well with anecdotal accounts of 
sentiment. Most proxies point to low sentiment in the first few years of the sample, which follow 
the 1961 crash in growth stocks – the closed-end fund discount and dividend premium are high, 
while turnover and equity issuance-related variables are low. Each variable identifies a spike in 
sentiment in 1968 and 1969, again matching anecdotal accounts. Sentiment then tails off until, 
by the mid-1970’s, it is low by most measures (recall that for turnover this is confounded by the 
deregulation). The late 1970’s through mid-1980’s sees generally rising sentiment, and according 
to the composite index, sentiment has not dropped below a medium level since 1980. At the end 
of 1999, near the peak of the Internet bubble, sentiment is again high by most proxies.  
This correspondence with anecdotal accounts is encouraging. It confirms, to the extent 
possible, that the proxies capture the intended variation. Also notable is that cleaning the proxies 
of macro conditions has little effect on their time-series properties. Indeed, Table 2 suggests that 
the cleaned proxies are equally if not more correlated with each other than are the raw proxies, 
suggesting that investor sentiment can be distinguished from macroeconomic conditions. Again, 
we consider only the cleaned proxies in our subsequent empirical work, in order to isolate the 
effect of sentiment from macroeconomic conditions. 
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V. Empirical tests 
A. Sorts 
Table 3 looks for conditional characteristics effects in a simple, nonparametric way. We 
place each monthly return observation into a bin according to the decile rank that a characteristic 
takes at the beginning of that month, and then according to the level of a sentiment proxy from 
the end of the previous calendar year. We compute the average monthly return for that bin and 
look for patterns. We report sorts on CEFD in Table 3a and SENTIMENT in Table 3b. As 
discussed above, we condition returns from calendar year t on the December of year t-1 values of 
CEFD and SENTIMENT. Also, to keep the meaning of the deciles relatively constant over time, 
we define them based on NYSE firms. The tradeoff is that there is not a uniform distribution of 
firms across bins in a given month.  
For brevity, we omit sorts on the five other sentiment proxies. They give similar results, 
available upon request, and they are broken out separately in all subsequent tables because they 
fit more compactly. But it is worth showing results for CEFD alongside the overall index, 
however, because CEFD is perhaps our cleanest “general” indicator of investor sentiment – it is 
not mechanically connected to sentiment for any one segment of the cross-section. In contrast, 
the volume of IPOs and the dividend premium could in principle be driven by a concentrated 
demand for firms with IPO characteristics or dividends, respectively. By comparing the results 
for CEFD to the results for other sentiment proxies, or the composite index, we can more clearly 
document a general sentiment effect.  
The first rows of Table 3 show the effect of size conditional on sentiment. They reveal 
that the cross-sectional size effect of Banz (1981) exists in low-sentiment conditions only, i.e. 
when CEFD is positive or SENTIMENT is negative (a final reminder that here, and in all 
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subsequent tables, the sentiment proxies are net of macroeconomic effects). Specifically, Table 
3b shows that when SENTIMENT is negative, returns average 2.37 percent per month for the 
bottom ME decile and 0.87 for the top decile. A similar pattern is apparent when conditioning on 
CEFD; a link between the size effect and closed-end fund discounts was previously noted by 
Swaminathan (1996). This pattern helps make sense of some long-known results. Namely, the 
size effect was known to be largely a January effect (Keim (1983), Blume and Stambaugh 
(1983)), and the January effect, in turn, was known to be stronger after a period of low returns 
(Reinganum (1983)), which is when sentiment is likely to be low.  
As an aside, note that the average returns across the first two rows of Table 3 show that 
subsequent returns tend to be higher across the board when sentiment is low. This is consistent 
with prior results that the equity share and turnover, for example, forecast market returns. More 
generally, it supports our premise that sentiment has broad effects, and so the existence of richer 
patterns within the cross-section should not be entirely surprising.  
The conditional cross-sectional effect of Age is especially striking. It seems that investors 
tend to demand young stocks when SENTIMENT is positive and old stocks when sentiment is 
negative. This is suggested by the conditional difference in returns between decile 10 and decile 
1 stocks. When SENTIMENT is pessimistic, top-decile Age firms return 0.55 percent less than 
bottom-decile Age firms, but return 0.73 percent more when SENTIMENT is optimistic. This is 
intriguing because Age shows no unconditional effect at all.7 The strong conditional effects will 
simply average out across high and low sentiment periods.  
The next rows indicate that the cross-sectional effect of return volatility is conditional on 
sentiment in the hypothesized manner. In particular, high Sigma stocks appear to be out of favor 
                                                 
7 This conclusion is in seeming contrast to Barry and Brown (1984)’s evidence of an unconditional negative period-
of-listing effect, but their sample excludes stocks listed for fewer than 61months.  
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when SENTIMENT is low – they earn returns of 2.29 percent per month. However, just as with 
Age, the cross-sectional effect of Sigma fully reverses in low sentiment conditions. 
The next rows examine profitability and dividends. For investors, perhaps the simplest 
and most salient comparison is between profitable and unprofitable (E<0) firms and payers and 
nonpayers (D=0). These contrasts are summarized in the extreme right columns, where we 
average returns across profitable firms and compare them to unprofitable firms, and do the same 
for dividends. These characteristics again display conditional sign-flip patterns. Table 3b shows 
that when SENTIMENT is positive, monthly returns are 0.33 percent higher on profitable than 
unprofitable firms and 0.43 percent higher on payers than nonpayers. When it is negative, 
however, returns are 0.92 percent per month lower on profitable firms and 0.81 percent lower on 
payers. Importantly, the left column shows that these patterns are driven mostly by conditional 
variation in the returns of unprofitable and nonpaying firms. As discussed above, because these 
firms tend to be more subjective to value and harder to arbitrage, theory predicts that they will be 
more sensitive to swings in sentiment.  
The remaining variables – book-to-market, external finance, and sales growth – also 
display intriguing patterns. Most simply, running across rows, one can see that each of them has 
some unconditional explanatory power. Expected returns are generally higher for high BE/ME 
stocks, low EF/A stocks, and low GS decile stocks. The EF/A result is reminiscent of Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995, 1999), while the GS result is suggested 
in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994).  
But a closer look reveals an intriguing conditional pattern in these variables: Each sort 
displays an inverted U-shaped difference in average returns, conditional on sentiment. Consider 
the GS variable in Table 3b. When SENTIMENT is high, there is an inverted U-shaped pattern 
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across GS, as summarized in the 5-1 and 10-5 decile contrasts, but when sentiment changes sign, 
this actually flips to an upward U. As a result, the difference across sentiment regimes makes a 
pronounced inverse U. Similar conditional U patterns appear in EF/A and BE/ME.  
This pattern suggests that investors demand both high growth and distressed firms when 
they are optimistic, or their speculative propensity is high, and avoid extremes when they are 
pessimistic, or their propensity to speculate is low. That sentiment has special implications for 
distressed firms was not suggested in our anecdotal history, but is consistent with theoretical 
predictions – both rapidly growing firms and those teetering on the brink are hardest to value and 
have especially high idiosyncratic risk. They are therefore expected to be more sensitive to 
sentiment than the “stable” firms in the middle deciles of these sorts. 
B. Predictive regressions for individual stocks 
 We turn to cross-sectional predictive regressions. We run monthly cross-sectional 
predictive regressions and then study how the coefficients change with investor sentiment. 
Compared to the sorts, this approach allows us to conduct formal inference, to determine which 
characteristics have conditional predictive ability that is distinct from well-known unconditional 
effects, and to present results for each of our sentiment proxies in a compact fashion.  
 As a baseline, we estimate the unconditional predictive ability of each characteristic. 
Each month, we run a cross-sectional univariate predictive regression: 
itittit XbaR e++= -1 , (3) 
where X is a given characteristic. For earnings and dividends characteristics, we simply consider 
the profitability and payer dummies, because the sorts suggest that these capture the main effects.  
Figure 2 reports the time series of the coefficients from these rolling regressions, and 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the average monthly coefficient and t-statistics based on the standard 
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deviation of the coefficients, as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). They confirm prior results that 
size, book-to-market, external finance, and sales growth have unconditional predictive power.  
 Panel B runs multivariate cross-sectional regressions to distinguish novel unconditional 
effects from the well-known effects of size, book-to-market, and momentum: 
( ) ( ) itittittittittit MOMmMEBEhMEsXbaR e+++++= ---- 1111 loglog , (4) 
where X denotes the characteristic of interest. (There is no X when we consider size and book-to-
market themselves.) Age is modestly significant, sales growth loses some of its unconditional 
effect, and external finance retains a strong independent effect. 
The key question is whether and how these coefficients change with investor sentiment. 
Are the fluctuations in Figure 2 connected to, or anticipated by, those in Figure 1? In Table 5, we 
address this question by regressing the monthly regression coefficients on sentiment proxies. The 
first several columns regress coefficients obtained from (3) on each of the proxies, while the last 
column regresses coefficients obtained from (4) on the composite index:8 
ttt dSENTIMENTcb e++= -1ˆ . (5) 
The sentiment proxies are all standardized. Standard errors are bootstrapped to correct for the 
bias induced if the autocorrelated sentiment proxies have innovations that are correlated with 
innovations in the coefficients, as in Stambaugh (1999).   
The results basically confirm the sorts. As sentiment increases (lower CEFDt-1 or PD-NDt-2 
or higher TURN t-2, NIPO t-1, RIPO t-2, S t-1, or SENTIMENT t-1), expected returns tend to decrease 
on small firms, young firms, firms with volatile returns, unprofitable firms, and non-dividend-
paying firms. In all cases the results are in the expected direction, and those using IPO volume as 
the sentiment proxy are particularly strong. While these effects clearly overlap to some extent, 
                                                 
8 Intuitively, in terms of Eq. (1), this procedure is regressing estimates of (b1+ b2Tt-1) on sentiment proxies Tt-1. 
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the last column shows that the connection between the cross-sectional effect of these variables 
and SENTIMENT can often be distinguished from arbitrarily time-varying effects of size, book-
to-market, and momentum.  
We give an example to illustrate the magnitude of the effects. In the second-to-last 
columns of Table 5, the 0.1 coefficient of SENTIMENT on ME means that a two-SD increase in 
the sentiment index raises the size coefficient by 0.2 percentage points per month. Table 4 shows 
that such a change would bring the conditional size effect from negative to zero, and this is in 
turn consistent with the Table 3b result that there is no size effect in high sentiment periods.  
Like the sorts, the regressions show that the cross-sectional effects of book-to-market, 
external finance, and sales growth do not have a strong monotonic relationship with sentiment. 
To capture their U-shaped conditional effects, we re-run (3) and (4) for these characteristics but 
limit the regression sample to observations that fall within the top or bottom seven deciles of 
these variables.9 The idea is to look at one side of the U at a time. For instance, the GS (1-7) row 
examines how the cross-sectional effect of sales growth varies with sentiment among firms in the 
lower range of sales growth, where a marginal increase predominantly reflects a move away 
from distress, not a move toward extreme growth. The GS (4-10) row examines the cross-
sectional effect of sales growth in a range where the main effect of a marginal increase is an 
move toward extreme growth, not a move away from distress. Effectively, we view GS (1-7) and 
GS (4-10) as separate characteristics with different meanings.  
Figure 2 plots the cross-sectional coefficients from these regressions. The plots show 
clearly that these characteristics have different cross-sectional effects in the bottom and top of 
their ranges. The last several rows of Table 5 indicate that this method successfully captures the 
                                                 
9 The decision of how many deciles to cut out is obviously somewhat arbitrary. The choice of three follows Fama 
and French (1993), who identify the top three BE/ME deciles with value and the bottom three with growth.  
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U-shaped conditional effects in book-to-market, external finance, and sales growth. As we found 
in the sorts, future returns on stocks with characteristics of either extreme growth or distress are 
negatively related to sentiment proxies. Some calculations will confirm that the size of the 
effects implied here are similar to those suggested in the sorts.  
C. Predictive regressions for long-short portfolios 
 A third way to look for conditional characteristics effects is to use sentiment to forecast 
portfolios that are long on stocks with high values of a characteristic and short on stocks with 
low values. We have just seen that the average payer, for example, earns higher returns than the 
average nonpayer when sentiment is high, so sentiment must forecast a long-short portfolio 
formed on dividend payment. But it is useful to examine explicitly whether sentiment affects 
portfolios like SMB and HML, for example, because they are often used to proxy for systematic 
risks. In addition, the portfolio method is less parametric than the regressions for individual 
stocks. To the extent that it delivers similar results, then, it indicates that the results are not 
driven by changes in the cross-sectional distribution of firm characteristics.  
The first several columns of Table 6 use individual sentiment proxies to predict long-
short portfolios:10 
itttLowXtHighX dSENTIMENTcRR itit e++=- -== 1,, .  (6) 
The dependent variable is the monthly return on a long-short portfolio, such as SMB, and the 
monthly returns from January through December of t are regressed on the lagged sentiment 
proxies. The last column again attempts to separates novel comovement effects from well-known 
effects using a multivariate prediction: 
                                                 
10 In terms of Eq. (1), this regresses (b1DX + b2Tt-1DX) on sentiment proxies Tt-1, where DX is the difference between 
“high” and “low” levels of a characteristic.  
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ittt
ttttLowXtHighX
mUMDhHML
sSMBRMKTdSENTIMENTcRR
itit
e
b
+++
+++=- -== 1,,
. (7) 
Obviously, we must exclude SMB and HML from the right side when those are the portfolios 
being forecast. RMRF is the excess return of the value-weighted market over the risk-free rate. 
UMD is the return on high-momentum stocks, where momentum is measured over the period 
from 12 months prior through 2 months prior, minus the return on low-momentum stocks. As 
described in Fama and French (1993), SMB is the return on portfolios of small and big ME stocks 
that is separate from returns on HML, and HML is constructed to isolate the difference between 
high- and low-BE/ME portfolios.11  
 For profitability and dividend payment, the coefficients estimated from the portfolio 
approach are identical to those estimated from the individual stock approach by construction. 
The other results are similar (the sign for predicting SMB is expected to be the opposite of the 
earlier ME sign). SMB is significantly related to sentiment in some specifications, while there is 
again an U-shaped conditional effect in HML and especially in the long-short portfolios formed 
on external finance and sales growth. We separate extreme growth opportunities effects from 
distress effects by constructing High, Medium, and Low portfolios based on the top three, middle 
four, and bottom three NYSE decile breakpoints, respectively. Using sentiment to forecast the 
High-Medium portfolio for sales growth, for example, is then analogous to using it to predict the 
cross-sectional effect of GS (4-10).  
D. Systematic risk 
 At face value, the conditional characteristics effects seem unlikely to be compensation for 
systematic risk. Among other considerations, the sentiment proxies have been orthogonalized to 
                                                 
11 These portfolios are taken from Ken French’s website and are described there. 
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macroeconomic conditions; the patterns match theoretical predictions about where the effects of 
sentiment should be most pronounced; and the patterns line up with anecdotal accounts of 
bubbles and crashes. Intuitively, the systematic risk explanation requires that older, profitable, 
dividend-paying firms are (when sentiment is high, i.e. in half of the sample) actually require 
higher returns than younger, unprofitable, nonpaying firms, and are recognized as such by the 
marginal investor. While this seems counterintuitive, we can consider, and largely rule out, this 
alternative explanation more rigorously.  
Systematic risk explanations come in two basic flavors. One is that the systematic risks 
(beta loadings) of stocks with certain characteristics vary with the sentiment proxies, despite our 
effort to isolate them from macro conditions. Table 7 investigates this directly. It asks whether 
sentiment coincides with time-variation in market betas in a way that could at least qualitatively 
reconcile the earlier results with a conditional CAPM. Specifically, we predict returns on the 
characteristics portfolios: 
 ( ) itttttLowXtHighX RMRFfSENTIMENTedSENTIMENTcRR itit eb ++++=- --== 11,, . (8) 
The time-varying betas story predicts that the composite coefficient bf, reported in Table 7, is of 
the same sign as the estimates of d in Table 6. However, it turns out that when the coefficient bf 
is statistically significant, it is the wrong sign in a majority of cases. We find similar results when 
we replace RMRF by aggregate consumption growth. A table is available upon request. 
The second systematic risk story keeps stocks’ betas fixed, but allows the risk premium 
to vary with sentiment, which means that the difference in required returns between the high- and 
low-beta stocks varies in proportion. However, this story runs into trouble with the simple fact 
that the predicted effect of several characteristics does not just vary in magnitude over time, but 
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in direction. This discussion, and the results of the next exercise, leads us to conclude that the 
results do not reflect compensation for classical systematic risks.  
E. Predictive regressions for earnings announcement returns 
Our last test is whether there are conditional characteristics effects in the returns around 
earnings announcements. La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that low book-
to-market stocks have lower average returns at earnings announcements than high book-to-
market stocks, suggesting systematic errors in earnings expectations. Likewise, if errors in 
earnings expectations account for some of our results, we might expect that the average earnings 
announcement return on small, young, volatile, unprofitable, nonpaying, extreme growth and/or 
distress stocks would tend to be inversely related to sentiment.  
This methodology, while appealing, has only limited power to detect how expectational 
errors affect our results. The essence of our results appears to be the correlated correction of 
mispricing, but a firm’s announcement event return picks up the expectational corrections that 
occur only to it alone and within its own announcement window. Malkiel (1999) illustrates the 
problem: “The music slowed drastically for the conglomerates on January 19, 1968. On that day, 
the granddaddy of the conglomerates, Litton Industries, announced that earnings for the second 
quarter of that year would be substantially less than forecast. … the announcement was greeted 
with disbelief and shock. In the selling wave that followed, conglomerate stocks declined by 
roughly 40 percent …” (p. 67). So, while a study of announcement event returns will capture the 
corrective effect of Litton Industries’ announcement on its own stock, it will pick up none of its 
broader effects, which are important to our main results. Nevertheless, an analysis of earnings 
announcements may provide a lower bound on the effect that sentiment-driven expectational 
errors have on our results. 
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We gather quarterly earnings announcement dates from the merged CRSP-Compustat 
file. The sample represents approximately 75% of the firm-quarters analyzed in the main tables, 
so coverage is fairly complete. But, these quarterly earnings announcement dates are available 
only beginning in January 1971, so we are missing the substantial time series variation in 
sentiment over the 1960s. For each firm-quarter observation, we compute the cumulative 
abnormal return over the value-weighted market index over trading days [-1, +1] around the 
report date. We then construct a quarterly series of average announcement effects for each 
characteristic decile, and attempt to predict it with the composite sentiment index: 
itttDecileX dSENTIMENTcCAR it e++= -= 1, . (9) 
Table 8 reports the coefficient estimates for each characteristic decile.  
The patterns in Table 8 need to be compared to those in Table 3b. In Table 8, 12 of the 82 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level. In Table 3b, on the other hand, 10 of the 82 estimated 
effects are very large in the sense that sentiment is associated with an conditional difference in 
monthly returns of over 1.50 percentage points. The intersection of these tables’ “strong results” 
is six cells, and the signs agree in all cases. In addition, four of the five cells that are strong in 
Table 3b but not significant in Table 8 have matching signs; in the opposite direction, five of the 
six significant results in Table 8 that are not associated with very large effects in Table 3b are at 
least of the same sign. One anomaly is the significantly negative coefficient on the oldest firms, 
but perhaps one anomaly is to be expected by chance in so many implicit comparisons.  
Overall, this suggests that some portion of the conditional characteristics effects probably 
reflects the correction of conditional errors in earnings expectations. But as noted above, this test 
is not powerful, and provides only a lower bound on the contribution of expectational errors.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 In classical finance theory, “investor sentiment” plays no role on the cross-section of 
stock prices, returns, or expected returns. This paper takes issue with the classical view. It 
marshals theoretical considerations, historical accounts of speculative episodes, and most 
importantly a set of novel empirical findings, in support of the view that investor sentiment, 
broadly defined, has significant cross-sectional effects. 
 To summarize, the main empirical finding is that the cross-section of future stock returns 
is conditional upon beginning-of-period proxies for investor sentiment. The patterns are rich, but 
straightforward to interpret and consistent with simple theoretical predictions. Specifically, when 
sentiment appears to be high, stocks that are likely to be relatively attractive to optimists and 
speculators and at the same time unattractive candidates for arbitrage – young stocks, small 
stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend paying stocks, high-volatility stocks, extreme-growth 
stocks, and distressed stocks – experience low future returns relative to other stocks. Conditional 
on low sentiment, on the other hand, these cross-sectional patterns attenuate or reverse. Several 
aspects of the results cast doubt on the hypothesis that they reflect rational compensation for 
systematic risk. Rather, they match simple theoretical predictions and line up well with historical 
accounts of bubbles and crashes.  
The conclusion that sentiment has broad cross-sectional effects obviously carries with it a 
number of significant implications for financial economics. Here we discuss just one example. 
An old question is whether firms that pay dividends endure higher costs of equity, as predicted 
by Brennan (1970), or whether dividends are irrelevant. Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and 
Scholes (1982), and Christie and Huang (1984), among others, show that the cross-sectional 
effect of the dividend yield on (pre-tax) returns is not reliably positive, and in fact quite unstable. 
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This is commonly interpreted as rejecting the tax hypothesis and supporting the classical 
irrelevance view. Our results, however, suggest that both views may be incorrect. While the 
cross-sectional effect of dividends is indeed unstable, its sign is predictable by sentiment. These 
facts fit better with the catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002), in which dividends are 
indeed relevant to current valuations, but with a time-varying sign.  
The results suggest several avenues for future work. In corporate finance, a better 
understanding of sentiment seems likely to shed light on time-series patterns in security issuance 
and the supply of firm characteristics that seem to be conditionally relevant to share price. For 
asset pricing, the results indicate that descriptively accurate models of expected returns need to 
better incorporate sentiment. The best way to do this is unclear; the conditional characteristics 
specification may offer a starting point. More generally, the paper has had little to say about how 
and why sentiment forms, only arguing that it is a very real force that has cross-sectional effects. 
An interesting open question is whether there are necessary macroeconomic preconditions for 
sentiment to bloom.  
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Figure 1. Investor Sentiment. The first panel shows the year-end, value-weighted average discount on closed-end 
mutual funds. The data on prices and net asset values (NAVs) come from Neal and Wheatley (1998) for 1962 
through 1993; CDA/Wiesenberger for 1994 through 1998; and turn-of-the-year issues of the Wall Street Journal for 
1999 and 2000. The second panel shows detrended log turnover. Turnover is the ratio of reported share volume to 
average shares listed from the NYSE Fact Book. We detrend using the past five-year average. The third panel shows 
the annual number of initial public offerings. The fourth panel shows the average annual first-day returns of initial 
public offerings. Both series come from Jay Ritter, updating data analyzed in Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). 
The fifth panel shows gross annual equity issuance divided by gross annual equity plus debt issuance from Baker 
and Wurgler (2000). We adjust the series for the one-time change in the share from 1983 to 1984. The sixth panel 
shows the year-end log ratio of the value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of payers and nonpayers from 
Baker and Wurgler (2003). The dashed line is raw data. We regress each measure on the growth in industrial 
production, the growth in durable, nondurable and services consumption, the growth in employment and a flag for 
NBER recessions. The solid line is the residuals from this regression. The final panel presents a first principal 
component index of the six orthogonalized measures. In the index, turnover, the average annual first-day return, and 
the dividend premium are lagged one year relative to the other three measures. 
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Figure 2. Average Annual Coefficients. Average annual coefficients from monthly univariate regressions of returns on firm characteristics X. 
ititttit eXbaR ++= -1  
The firm characteristics are size, age, total risk, indicator variables for profitable firms and dividend payers, book-to-market ratio, external finance over assets, 
and sales growth decile. Size is the log of market equity. Market equity (ME) is price times shares outstanding from CRSP. Age is the number of years since the 
firm’s first appearance on CRSP. Total risk is the annual standard deviation in monthly returns from CRSP. Earnings (E) is defined as income before 
extraordinary items (Item 18) plus income statement deferred taxes (Item 50) minus preferred dividends (Item 19). The book-to-market ratio is the log of the ratio 
of book equity to market equity. Book equity (BE) is defined as shareholders equity (Item 60) plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Item 35). External finance (EF) 
is equal to the change in assets (Item 6) less the change in retained earnings (Item 36). When the change in retained earnings is not available we use net income 
(Item 172) less common dividends (Item 21) instead. Sales growth decile is formed using NYSE breakpoints for sales growth. Sales growth is the percentage 
change in net sales (Item 12). For the last three characteristics, we analyze the top (solid) and bottom (dashed) seven deciles separately. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, 1963-2001. Panel A summarizes the returns variables. Returns are measured monthly. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the 
cumulative return for the eleven-month period between 12 and two months prior to t. Panel B summarizes the size, age, and risk characteristics. Size is the log of 
market equity. Market equity (ME) is price times shares outstanding from CRSP in the June prior to t. Age is the number of years between the firm’s first 
appearance on CRSP and t. Total risk (s) is the annual standard deviation in monthly returns from CRSP for the 12 months ending in the June prior to t. Panel C 
summarizes profitability variables. The earnings-price ratio is defined for firms with positive earnings. Earnings (E) is defined as income before extraordinary 
items (Item 18) plus income statement deferred taxes (Item 50) minus preferred dividends (Item 19). Book equity (BE) is defined as shareholders equity (Item 
60) plus balance sheet deferred taxes (Item 35). Panel D reports dividend variables. Dividends (D) are equal to dividends per share at the ex date (Item 26) times 
shares outstanding (Item 25). Panel E reports variables used as proxies for growth opportunities and distress. The book-to-market ratio is the log of the ratio of 
book equity to market equity. External finance (EF) is equal to the change in assets (Item 6) less the change in retained earnings (Item 36). When the change in 
retained earnings is not available we use net income (Item 172) less common dividends (Item 21) instead. Sales growth decile is formed using NYSE breakpoints 
for sales growth. Sales growth is the percentage change in net sales (Item 12). In Panels C through E, accounting data from the fiscal year ending in t-1 are 
matched to monthly returns from July of year t through June of year t+1. All variables are Winsorized at 99.5 and 0.5 percent.  
 
 Full Sample Subsample Means 
 N Mean SD Min Max 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-1 
 Panel A. Returns 
Rt (%) 1,398,495 1.38 18.69 -98.13 2400.00 1.06 1.59 1.24 1.45 1.20 
MOM t-1 (%) 1,398,495 13.44 60.31 -85.99 359.42 21.40 12.50 14.85 12.10 12.02 
 Panel B. Size and Age 
MEt-1 ($M) 1,398,495 576 2,153 1 21,623 392 238 373 807 1,412 
Aget (Years) 1,398,495 13.72 13.91 0.03 69.17 16.02 12.96 13.84 13.70 14.14 
s t-1 (%) 1,375,961 14.21 8.92 0.00 62.39 9.40 12.58 13.68 14.77 21.59 
 Panel C. Profitability 
E+/BEt-1 (%) 1,398,495 10.62 10.31 0.00 67.14 12.13 12.09 11.29 9.27 9.09 
E>0t-1 1,398,495 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.91 0.77 0.68 0.63 
 Panel D. Dividend Policy 
D/BEt-1 (%) 1,398,495 1.97 2.96 0.00 17.61 4.43 2.72 1.98 1.36 1.05 
D>0t-1 1,398,495 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.65 0.48 0.30 0.24 
 Panel E. Growth Opportunities and Distress 
BE/MEt-1 1,398,495 0.93 0.86 0.02 5.78 0.70 1.35 0.92 0.72 0.81 
EF/At-1 (%) 1,365,152 11.69 24.98 -69.17 131.18 7.11 6.34 10.71 14.76 19.13 
GSt-1 (Decile) 1,349,505 5.93 3.19 1.00 10.00 5.65 5.66 5.97 6.12 5.90 
Table 2. Investor Sentiment. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for measures of investor sentiment. The first measure (CEFD) is the year-end, value-
weighted average discount on closed-end mutual funds. The data on prices and net asset values (NAVs) come from Neal and Wheatley (1998) for 1962 through 
1993; CDA/Wiesenberger for 1994 through 1998; and turn-of-the-year issues of the Wall Street Journal for 1999 and 2000. The second measure (TURN) is 
detrended log turnover. Turnover is the ratio of reported share volume to average shares listed from the NYSE Fact Book. We detrend using the past five-year 
average. The third measure (NIPO) is the annual number of initial public offerings. The fourth measure (RIPO) is the average annual first-day returns of initial 
public offerings. Both IPO series come from Jay Ritter, updating data analyzed in Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). The fifth measure (S) is gross annual 
equity issuance divided by gross annual equity plus debt issuance from Baker and Wurgler (2000). The sixth measure (PD-ND) is the year-end log ratio of the 
value-weighted average market-to-book ratios of payers and nonpayers from Baker and Wurgler (2003). Turnover, the average annual first-day return, and the 
dividend premium are lagged one year relative to the other three measures. In the first panel, we present raw data. In the second panel, we regress each measure 
on the growth in industrial production, the growth in durable, nondurable and services consumption, the growth in employment and a flag for NBER recessions. 
The adjusted measures are the residuals from these regressions. SENTIMENT is the first principal component of the six orthogonalized measures. a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
     Correlations 
 Mean SD Min Max SENTIMENT CEFD TURN NIPO RIPO S PD-ND 
 Panel A. Raw data 
CEFDt 8.83 8.11 -10.41 23.70 -0.59
a 1.00      
TURNt-1 5.21 7.94 -11.60 18.66 0.66
a -0.30c 1.00     
NIPOt 358.41 262.76 9.00 953.00 0.65
a -0.57a 0.38b 1.00    
RIPOt-1 16.94 14.93 -1.67 69.53 0.83
a -0.41b 0.50a 0.35b 1.00   
St 19.53 8.34 7.83 43.00 0.39
b 0.01 0.30c 0.16 0.26 1.00  
Pt-1
D-ND 0.20 18.67 -33.17 36.06 -0.79a 0.53a -0.50a -0.56a -0.58a -0.12 1.00 
 Panel B. Controlling for macroeconomic conditions 
CEFDt 0.00 6.15 -18.33 9.16 -0.60
a 1.00      
TURNt-1 0.00 6.73 -11.31 11.45 0.70
a -0.29c 1.00     
NIPOt 0.00 226.30 -435.98 484.15 0.72
a -0.46a 0.39b 1.00    
RIPOt-1 0.00 14.31 -23.55 46.54 0.87
a -0.45a 0.53a 0.44a 1.00   
St 0.00 6.15 -12.17 14.29 0.63
a -0.40b 0.32b 0.50a 0.47a 1.00  
Pt-1
D-ND 0.00 16.89 -43.20 35.96 -0.81a 0.28c -0.60a -0.46a -0.68a -0.28c 1.00 
Table 3a. Two-way Sorts: Closed-End Fund Discount and Firm Characteristics. For each month, we form ten portfolios according to the NYSE breakpoints 
of firm size (ME), age, total risk, earnings-book ratio for profitable firms (E/BE), dividend-book ratio for dividend payers (D/BE), book-to-market ratio 
(BE/ME), external finance over assets (EF/A), and sales growth (GS). We also calculate portfolio returns for unprofitable firms and nonpayers. We then report 
average portfolio returns over months where CEFD (orthogonalized to macroeconomic conditions) is positive, negative, and the difference between the two 
averages.  
 
 CEFDt-1 Decile Overall 
  £0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 10-5 5-1 
>0-
£0 
ME Positive   2.39 1.93 1.81 1.80 1.83 1.63 1.62 1.50 1.38 1.31 -1.08 -0.52 -0.57  
 Negative  0.46 0.21 0.36 0.24 0.54 0.34 0.45 0.55 0.47 0.38 -0.08 -0.16 0.08  
 Difference  1.93 1.73 1.46 1.56 1.29 1.30 1.17 0.95 0.91 0.93 -1.00 -0.35 -0.65  
Age Positive   1.95 1.99 2.06 1.94 2.03 1.98 1.57 1.67 1.63 1.48 -0.48 -0.55 0.08  
 Negative   -0.24 0.48 0.67 0.46 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.58 0.72 0.96 0.08 0.88  
 Difference  2.20 1.51 1.39 1.47 1.40 1.34 0.91 1.01 1.05 0.76 -1.44 -0.64 -0.80  
s Positive   1.35 1.51 1.52 1.68 1.82 1.92 1.91 2.08 2.17 2.37 1.01 0.54 0.47  
 Negative   0.84 0.84 0.78 0.66 0.69 0.52 0.49 0.39 0.41 0.07 -0.77 -0.62 -0.15  
 Difference  0.51 0.67 0.74 1.02 1.13 1.40 1.42 1.69 1.76 2.29 1.78 1.16 0.62  
E/BE Positive  2.48 2.21 2.08 2.10 1.92 1.79 1.95 1.90 1.88 1.77 1.87 -0.34 0.08 -0.42 -0.62 
 Negative  0.24 0.53 0.65 0.89 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.48 0.36 -0.17 -0.11 -0.06 0.23 
 Difference 2.24 1.68 1.44 1.21 1.39 1.31 1.46 1.52 1.38 1.29 1.51 -0.17 0.20 -0.36 -0.85 
D/BE Positive  2.35 2.07 1.91 1.92 1.77 1.72 1.59 1.52 1.46 1.44 1.37 -0.70 -0.34 -0.35 -0.63 
 Negative  0.12 0.60 0.52 0.72 0.47 0.61 0.67 0.77 0.70 0.72 0.81 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.53 
 Difference 2.23 1.47 1.39 1.19 1.30 1.11 0.92 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.56 -0.91 -0.54 -0.36 -1.16 
BE/ME Positive   1.47 1.71 1.77 1.86 1.86 1.93 2.12 2.11 2.33 2.58 1.10 0.72 0.39  
 Negative   -0.26 0.09 0.35 0.38 0.57 0.67 0.67 0.76 0.89 0.94 1.21 0.37 0.83  
 Difference  1.74 1.62 1.42 1.49 1.29 1.26 1.45 1.35 1.44 1.64 -0.10 0.34 -0.44  
EF/A Positive   2.52 2.19 2.08 1.98 1.83 1.88 1.88 1.79 1.92 1.66 -0.86 -0.17 -0.69  
 Negative   0.76 0.75 0.85 0.77 0.73 0.62 0.39 0.38 0.25 -0.47 -1.23 -1.20 -0.03  
 Difference  1.76 1.44 1.23 1.21 1.10 1.26 1.49 1.42 1.67 2.12 0.37 1.02 -0.66  
GS Positive   2.36 2.04 1.97 1.79 1.82 1.88 1.99 2.08 1.90 1.81 -0.56 -0.01 -0.54  
 Negative   0.66 0.60 0.58 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.56 0.35 -0.42 -1.09 -1.05 -0.04  
 Difference  1.70 1.44 1.38 1.14 1.20 1.21 1.31 1.52 1.55 2.23 0.53 1.04 -0.50  
Table 3b. Two-way Sorts: Sentiment Index and Firm Characteristics. For each month, we form ten portfolios according to the NYSE breakpoints of firm 
size (ME), age, total risk, earnings-book ratio for profitable firms (E/BE), dividend-book ratio for dividend payers (D/BE), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), 
external finance over assets (EF/A), and sales growth (GS). We also calculate portfolio returns for unprofitable firms and nonpayers. We then report average 
portfolio returns over months where SENTIMENT (orthogonalized to macroeconomic conditions) is positive, negative, and the difference between the two 
averages.  
 
 SENTIMENTt-1 Decile Overall 
  £0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 10-5 5-1 
>0-
£0 
ME Positive   0.92 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.97 0.87 1.10 1.03 1.01 1.00 0.08 0.02 0.05  
 Negative   2.37 1.67 1.67 1.55 1.67 1.37 1.20 1.22 1.02 0.87 -1.50 -0.80 -0.70  
 Difference  -1.45 -0.84 -0.85 -0.73 -0.69 -0.51 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 0.13 1.58 0.82 0.75  
Age Positive   0.36 0.99 1.10 1.05 1.30 1.31 1.05 1.16 1.07 1.09 0.73 -0.21 0.94  
 Negative   1.81 1.81 1.92 1.65 1.65 1.58 1.36 1.37 1.37 1.26 -0.55 -0.39 -0.16  
 Difference  -1.46 -0.83 -0.82 -0.60 -0.35 -0.28 -0.32 -0.21 -0.31 -0.17 1.28 0.18 1.10  
s Positive   1.25 1.27 1.11 1.13 1.18 1.07 1.03 1.01 0.91 0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.07  
 Negative   1.03 1.20 1.34 1.41 1.57 1.67 1.67 1.81 2.05 2.29 1.26 0.73 0.54  
 Difference  0.23 0.07 -0.24 -0.28 -0.38 -0.60 -0.64 -0.79 -1.14 -1.64 -1.86 -1.26 -0.61  
E/BE Positive  0.65 0.76 1.00 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.96 1.04 1.06 0.96 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.33 
 Negative  2.59 2.37 2.05 2.36 1.81 1.59 1.81 1.64 1.64 1.44 1.59 -0.78 0.01 -0.78 -0.92 
 Difference -1.94 -1.61 -1.05 -1.44 -0.87 -0.63 -0.87 -0.68 -0.60 -0.38 -0.63 0.98 -0.01 0.98 1.25 
D/BE Positive  0.66 1.03 1.03 1.21 0.98 1.11 1.07 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.05 0.02 -0.06 0.09 0.43 
 Negative  2.31 1.97 1.69 1.68 1.52 1.44 1.38 1.29 1.17 1.18 1.25 -0.72 -0.19 -0.52 -0.81 
 Difference -1.64 -0.94 -0.66 -0.46 -0.54 -0.33 -0.32 -0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.20 0.74 0.13 0.61 1.24 
BE/ME Positive   0.27 0.78 0.96 1.00 1.11 1.21 1.19 1.22 1.35 1.40 1.13 0.29 0.85  
 Negative   1.32 1.37 1.47 1.55 1.59 1.66 1.91 1.95 2.19 2.48 1.16 0.89 0.27  
 Difference  -1.06 -0.59 -0.51 -0.54 -0.48 -0.45 -0.72 -0.73 -0.84 -1.08 -0.03 -0.61 0.58  
EF/A Positive   1.29 1.19 1.36 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.11 0.93 0.82 0.17 -1.12 -1.07 -0.05  
 Negative   2.38 2.06 1.82 1.73 1.55 1.53 1.46 1.54 1.71 1.49 -0.89 -0.06 -0.83  
 Difference  -1.10 -0.86 -0.47 -0.46 -0.32 -0.31 -0.35 -0.61 -0.89 -1.32 -0.23 -1.01 0.78  
GS Positive   1.04 1.19 1.23 1.15 1.21 1.19 1.23 1.16 0.94 0.22 -0.82 -1.00 0.18  
 Negative   2.37 1.75 1.60 1.53 1.47 1.60 1.71 1.80 1.64 1.66 -0.71 0.19 -0.90  
 Difference  -1.34 -0.56 -0.36 -0.37 -0.26 -0.41 -0.47 -0.64 -0.70 -1.44 -0.11 -1.19 1.08  
Table 4. Baseline Regressions, Monthly Returns. Average coefficients and t-statistics from monthly regressions of returns on firm characteristics (X), size 
(log(ME)), book-to-market (log(BE/ME)), and momentum (MOM).  
( ) ( ) itittittittitttit eMOMmMEBEhMEsXbaR +++++= ---- 1111 loglog  
We only report the average of bt. The firm characteristics are firm size (log(ME)), age (log(Age)), total risk (s), an indicator variable for profitable firms (E>0) 
and dividend payers (D>0), book-to-market ratio (log(BE/ME)), external finance over assets (EF/A), and sales growth decile (GS). The first panel shows 
univariate results. The second panel includes book-to-market, size, and momentum as control variables. Standard errors are equal to the time series standard 
deviation of bt divided by the number of months. 
  
ME Age s E>0 D>0 BE/ME EF/A GS/10 
s t(s) b t(b) b t(b) b t(b) b t(b) h t(h) b t(b) b t(b) 
Panel A. Univariate 
-0.17 [-3.3] 0.04 [0.7] 1.45 [1.0] -0.26 [-1.3] -0.17 [-0.8] 0.47 [6.5] -1.64 [-6.7] -0.59 [-4.6] 
Panel B. Controlling for Book-to-Market, Size, and Momentum 
-0.18 [-3.4] 0.10 [2.8]       0.31 [4.4]     
-0.16 [-3.7]   -0.40 [-0.4]     0.34 [5.4]     
-0.16 [-3.3]     -0.05 [-0.4]   0.35 [4.9]     
-0.16 [-3.5]       0.05 [0.4] 0.34 [5.1]     
-0.14 [-2.4]         0.52 [6.6]     
-0.16 [-3.0]         0.26 [3.8] -1.16 [-6.8]   
-0.15 [-2.8]         0.32 [4.4]   -0.26 [-2.7] 
Table 5. Time Series Regressions, Monthly Returns Coefficients. Two-stage regression. In the first stage, we compute coefficients from monthly regressions 
of returns on firm characteristics (X), size (log(ME)), book-to-market (log(BE/ME)), and momentum (MOM).  
( ) ( ) itittittittitttit eMOMmMEBEhMEsXbaR +++++= ---- 1111 loglog  
The firm characteristics are firm size (log(ME)), age (log(Age)), total risk (s), an indicator variable for profitable firms (E>0) and dividend payers (D>0), book-
to-market ratio (log(BE/ME)), external finance over assets (EF/A), and sales growth decile (GS). When we analyze growth opportunities, we exclude the top 
(bottom) three deciles for book-to-market ratio (external finance, sales growth). When we analyze distress, we exclude the bottom (top) three deciles for book-to-
market ratio (external finance, sales growth). In the second stage, we regress the monthly coefficients bt on measures of investor sentiment, each standardized to 
have unit variance. 
ttt udSENTIMENTcb ++= -1ˆ  
Coefficients are matched to the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), the number of IPOs (NIPO), and the equity share (S) for the calendar year one year before t. 
Coefficeints are matched to detrended log turnover (TURN), the average annual first-day return (RIPO), and the dividend premium (PD-ND) for the calendar year 
two years before t. All sentiment measures are orthogonalized to macroeconomic conditions. The first seven columns show univariate results. The last column 
includes size, book-to-market, and momentum as control variables in the first-stage regression and uses the sentiment index in the second stage. Bootstrap p-
values are in braces. 
 
 
CEFDt-1 TURN t-2 NIPO t-1 RIPO t-2 S t-1 P t-2
D-ND SENTIMENTt-1 
SENTIMENTt-1 
Controlling for 
ME, BE/ME, 
and MOM 
 d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) 
ME -0.2 [.00] 0.1 [.10] 0.2 [.00] 0.1 [.18] 0.1 [.06] -0.0 [.49] 0.1 [.02] 0.1 [.03] 
Age -0.2 [.01] 0.1 [.14] 0.3 [.00] 0.1 [.13] 0.2 [.01] -0.0 [.59] 0.2 [.01] 0.0 [.51] 
s 6.7 [.00] -3.6 [.07] -7.5 [.00] -4.8 [.01] -5.0 [.01] 3.0 [.16] -6.4 [.00] -3.5 [.01] 
E>0 -0.7 [.00] 0.5 [.03] 0.9 [.00] 0.5 [.03] 0.5 [.03] -0.4 [.09] 0.7 [.00] 0.4 [.01] 
D>0 -0.8 [.00] 0.5 [.06] 1.0 [.00] 0.4 [.09] 0.6 [.01] -0.3 [.31] 0.7 [.00] 0.4 [.00] 
BE/ME -0.0 [.65] 0.1 [.47] 0.1 [.13] 0.0 [.74] 0.1 [.16] -0.0 [.98] 0.1 [.41] 0.2 [.09] 
EF/A 0.6 [.02] -0.1 [.73] -0.6 [.03] -0.2 [.49] -0.8 [.00] 0.0 [.97] -0.4 [.15] -0.3 [.19] 
GS 0.2 [.15] -0.1 [.51] -0.3 [.05] -0.2 [.31] -0.3 [.07] 0.1 [.67] -0.2 [.15] -0.1 [.44] 
BE/ME (1-7) -0.1 [.29] 0.1 [.17] 0.3 [.01] 0.1 [.31] 0.2 [.09] -0.1 [.41] 0.2 [.09] 0.2 [.05] 
EF/A (4-10) 1.8 [.00] -0.7 [.20] -1.9 [.00] -0.9 [.06] -1.5 [.01] 0.6 [.31] -1.6 [.00] -0.8 [.03] 
GS (4-10) 0.1 [.00] -0.1 [.03] -0.1 [.00] -0.1 [.04] -0.1 [.01] 0.1 [.10] -0.1 [.00] -0.1 [.01] 
BE/ME (4-10) 0.1 [.26] -0.1 [.21] -0.1 [.16] -0.1 [.46] 0.0 [.91] 0.2 [.15] -0.1 [.18] 0.0 [.70] 
EF/A (1-7) -2.1 [.00] 1.1 [.09] 2.4 [.00] 1.4 [.04] 0.7 [.33] -1.4 [.07] 2.0 [.01] 0.9 [.02] 
GS (1-7) -0.1 [.02] 0.1 [.03] 0.1 [.00] 0.0 [.11] 0.0 [.26] -0.0 [.10] 0.1 [.02] 0.0 [.08] 
Table 6. Time Series Regressions, Portfolios. Regressions of long-short portfolio returns on measures of sentiment (S), each standardized to have unit variance, 
the market risk premium (RMRF), the Fama-French factors (HML and SMB), and a momentum factor (UMD). 
tttttttlowXthighX umUMDhHMLsSMBRMRFdSENTIMENTcRR itit ++++++=- -== b1,,  
The long-short portfolios are formed based on firm characteristics (X): firm size (ME), age, total risk (s), profitability (E), dividends (D), book-to-market ratio 
(BE/ME), external finance over assets (EF/A), and sales growth decile (GS). High is defined as a firm in the top three NYSE deciles; low is defined as a firm in 
the bottom three NYSE deciles; medium is defined as a firm in the middle four NYSE deciles. Monthly returns are matched to the closed-end fund discount 
(CEFD), the number of IPOs (NIPO), and the equity share (S) for the calendar year one year before t. Monthly returns are matched to detrended log turnover 
(TURN), the average annual first-day return (RIPO), and the dividend premium (PD-ND) for the calendar year two years before t. All sentiment measures are 
orthogonalized to macroeconomic conditions. The first seven columns show univariate results. The last column includes RMRF, SMB, HML, and UMD as 
control variables. Bootstrap p-values are in braces. 
 
  
CEFDt-1 TURN t-2 NIPO t-1 RIPO t-2 S t-1 P t-2
D-ND SENTIMENTt-1 
SENTIMENTt-1 
Controlling for 
ME, BE/ME, 
and MOM 
  d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) d p(d) 
ME SMB 0.4 [.01] -0.2 [.39] -0.6 [.00] -0.1 [.48] -0.3 [.13] 0.1 [.61] -0.3 [.07] -0.2 [.18] 
Age High-Low -0.6 [.02] 0.3 [.19] 0.9 [.00] 0.2 [.25] 0.6 [.01] -0.1 [.57] 0.6 [.02] 0.2 [.09] 
s High-Low 0.9 [.00] -0.5 [.06] -1.0 [.00] -0.4 [.12] -0.7 [.02] 0.4 [.28] -0.8 [.01] -0.4 [.03] 
E >0 - <0 -0.7 [.00] 0.5 [.05] 0.9 [.00] 0.4 [.07] 0.5 [.03] -0.4 [.09] 0.7 [.00] 0.5 [.02] 
D >0 - =0 -0.8 [.00] 0.5 [.07] 1.0 [.00] 0.4 [.10] 0.6 [.01] -0.3 [.28] 0.7 [.00] 0.4 [.01] 
BE/ME HML -0.1 [.45] 0.1 [.49] 0.2 [.23] 0.2 [.19] 0.2 [.20] 0.0 [.89] 0.2 [.30] 0.1 [.67] 
EF/A High-Low 0.2 [.15] -0.1 [.63] -0.3 [.01] -0.1 [.36] -0.3 [.01] 0.1 [.37] -0.2 [.08] -0.1 [.30] 
GS High-Low 0.1 [.21] -0.0 [.71] -0.2 [.07] -0.1 [.33] -0.2 [.14] 0.0 [.69] -0.2 [.17] -0.1 [.45] 
BE/ME Low-Medium -0.1 [.25] 0.2 [.23] 0.3 [.02] 0.1 [.38] 0.2 [.06] -0.1 [.48] 0.2 [.09] 0.1 [.31] 
EF/A High-Medium 0.4 [.01] -0.2 [.07] -0.5 [.00] -0.2 [.09] -0.4 [.01] 0.2 [.10] -0.4 [.00] -0.2 [.01] 
GS High-Medium 0.4 [.00] -0.3 [.04] -0.5 [.00] -0.3 [.04] -0.3 [.02] 0.2 [.13] -0.4 [.00] -0.2 [.01] 
BE/ME High-Medium 0.1 [.39] -0.1 [.44] -0.1 [.26] -0.0 [.69] 0.0 [.89] 0.1 [.18] -0.1 [.33] -0.1 [.47] 
EF/A Low-Medium -0.2 [.00] 0.2 [.02] 0.2 [.00] 0.1 [.16] 0.1 [.32] -0.1 [.12] 0.2 [.01] 0.2 [.00] 
GS Low-Medium -0.3 [.02] 0.2 [.03] 0.3 [.01] 0.2 [.14] 0.2 [.15] -0.2 [.13] 0.3 [.02] 0.2 [.09] 
Table 7. Conditional Market Betas. Regressions of long-short portfolio returns on the market risk premium (RMRF) and the market risk premium interacted 
with measures of sentiment (S) , each standardized to have unit variance. 
( ) tttttlowXthighX uRMRFfSENTIMENTedSENTIMENTcRR itit ++++=- --== 11,, b  
The long-short portfolios are formed based on firm characteristics (X): firm size (ME), age, total risk (s), profitability (E), dividends (D), book-to-market ratio 
(BE/ME), external finance over assets (EF/A), and sales growth decile (GS). High is defined as a firm in the top three NYSE deciles; low is defined as a firm in 
the bottom three NYSE deciles; medium is defined as a firm in the middle four NYSE deciles. Monthly returns are matched to the closed-end fund discount 
(CEFD), the number of IPOs (NIPO), and the equity share (S) for the calendar year one year before t. Monthly returns are matched to detrended log turnover 
(TURN), the average annual first-day return (RIPO), and the dividend premium (PD-ND) for the calendar year two years before t. All sentiment measures are 
orthogonalized to macroeconomic conditions. T-statistics are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
  CEFDt-1 TURN t-2 NIPO t-1 RIPO t-2 S t-1 P t-2
D-ND SENTIMENTt-1 
  bf t(bf) bf t(bf) bf t(bf) bf t(bf) bf t(bf) bf t(bf) bf t(bf) 
ME SMB -0.01 [-0.2] -0.02 [-0.6] -0.03 [-0.8] 0.02 [0.5] -0.01 [-0.3] 0.05 [1.4] -0.02 [-0.5] 
Age High-Low -0.02 [-0.5] -0.13b [-2.9] 0.01 [0.4] -0.13b [-2.7] 0.02 [0.6] 0.15b [3.0] -0.10b [-2.2] 
s High-Low 0.05 [1.1] 0.10 [2.0] -0.07 [-1.7] 0.10 [1.9] -0.06 [-1.3] -0.07 [-1.4] 0.04 [0.8] 
E >0-<0 0.08 [1.7] 0.09 [1.9] -0.06 [-1.6] 0.05 [0.9] -0.07 [-1.5] -0.04 [-0.7] 0.00 [0.0] 
D >0-<0 -0.02 [-0.5] -0.10b [-2.2] 0.05 [1.2] -0.08 [-1.8] 0.02 [0.6] 0.06 [1.4] -0.05 [-1.0] 
BE/ME HML 0.04 [0.9] -0.12b [-3.0] -0.06 [-1.7] -0.08b [-2.2] -0.07 [-1.9] 0.16a [3.6] -0.12b [-3.2] 
EF/A High-Low 0.00 [0.2] 0.08b [4.1] -0.00 [0.0] 0.10b [4.4] -0.00 [-0.3] -0.14b [-6.8] 0.09b [3.9] 
GS High-Low -0.03 [-0.2] 0.30 [1.3] -0.19 [-1.0] 0.55b [3.3] 0.06 [0.3] -0.84b [-3.8] 0.46b [2.1] 
BE/ME Low-Medium 0.01 [0.2] -0.07b [-2.5] -0.01 [-0.3] -0.09b [-2.8] -0.04 [-1.4] 0.12b [3.4] -0.09b [-2.8] 
EF/A High-Medium 0.01 [0.7] 0.07b [3.0] -0.02 [-1.0] 0.08b [3.2] -0.01 [-0.4] -0.09b [-3.4] 0.06b [2.4] 
GS High-Medium -0.00 [-0.2] 0.07b [3.0] -0.01 [-0.6] 0.08b [3.6] -0.00 [-0.1] -0.10b [-4.1] 0.07b [2.8] 
BE/ME High-Medium 0.03 [1.9] -0.06a [-3.3] -0.05a [-2.6] -0.04a [-3.2] -0.03 [-1.6] 0.10a [4.5] -0.07a [-3.9] 
EF/A Low-Medium -0.01 [-0.8] 0.02 [1.2] 0.02 [1.3] 0.02 [1.3] 0.00 [0.3] -0.05a [-3.5] 0.03 [1.9] 
GS Low-Medium 0.00 [0.0] -0.04 [-1.7] -0.01 [-0.4] -0.03 [-1.7] 0.01 [0.4] 0.01 [0.7] -0.02 [-1.1] 
 
a Statistically significant bf that matches the sign of the return predictability from Tables 5 and 6. 
b Statistically significant bf that does not match the sign of the return predictability from Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 8. Announcement Effects. For each calendar quarter, we form ten portfolios according to the NYSE breakpoints of firm size (ME), age, total risk, 
earnings-book ratio for profitable firms (E/BE), dividend-book ratio for dividend payers (D/BE), book-to-market ratio (BE/ME), external finance over assets 
(EF/A), and sales growth (GS). We also calculate average announcement effects for unprofitable firms and nonpayers. We then regress the average quarterly 
earnings announcement effects for each portfolio on lagged values of the sentiment index.  
ttt ubSENTIMENTaR ++= -1  
We report b. Quarterly average announcement effects are matched to the sentiment index for the calendar year one year before t. T-statistics are 
heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
 Decile 
 £0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ME  -0.20 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 
  [-2.24] [-0.28] [-0.11] [-1.26] [-1.02] [-0.88] [-0.22] [-0.77] [0.04] [-1.09] 
Age  -0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 
  [-0.84] [0.10] [-1.23] [-1.22] [-2.01] [-0.04] [0.87] [-0.74] [-0.55] [-3.09] 
s  0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.31 
  [0.91] [0.73] [0.25] [0.75] [-1.29] [-0.59] [-0.21] [-0.24] [-1.03] [-3.55] 
E/BE -0.33 -0.23 0.06 0.11 -0.16 -0.13 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.10 
 [-2.96] [-2.19] [0.83] [0.84] [-1.76] [-1.52] [-0.68] [-0.32] [0.04] [-0.14] [1.47] 
D/BE -0.19 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 
 [-2.26] [-0.02] [-1.32] [-0.64] [-0.33] [-1.01] [-0.08] [-1.20] [-2.07] [0.55] [-0.72] 
BE/ME  -0.10 0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.13 -0.18 
  [-1.43] [-0.07] [0.54] [-0.45] [-0.90] [0.30] [-1.74] [-0.03] [-1.54] [-1.62] 
EF/A  -0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 -0.14 -0.06 
  [-0.57] [-0.77] [0.54] [-1.23] [0.11] [-1.12] [-2.65] [-0.50] [-2.02] [-0.70] 
GS  -0.24 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 
  [-2.36] [-0.62] [-1.39] [-0.46] [-0.55] [0.34] [-1.21] [0.08] [-0.91] [-0.68] 
 
